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DYNAMIC MODELING OF NONTARGETED AND TARGETED ADVERTISING
STRATEGIES IN AN OLIGOPOLY
CHLOE A. FLETCHER AND JASON S. HOWELL
Abstract. With the growing collection of sales and marketing data and depth of detailed knowledge of
consumer habits and trends, firms are gaining the capability to discern customers of other firms from
the potential market of uncommitted consumers. Firms with this capability will be able to implement a
strategy where the advertising effort towards customers of competing firms may differ from that towards
uncommitted consumers. In this work, dynamic models for advertising in an oligopoly setting with fixed
total market size and sales decay are presented. Two models are described in detail: a nontargeted model in
which the advertising effort is the same for both categories of prospective customers, and a targeted model
that gives firms the capability to allocate effort across the two categories differently. In the differential game
setting, open-loop and closed-loop Nash equilibrium strategies are derived for both models. Several strategic
questions that a firm may face when practicing targeted advertising on a fixed budget are discussed and
addressed.
1. Introduction
Recent advances in technology are enabling the collection of data that constructs a detailed profile of
consumer behavior. Firms who gain sales from advertising in a competitive setting will be faced with the
challenge of selecting the ideal level of tailoring advertising campaigns based on consumer preferences. While
analyzing internet browsing history data to target advertisements is now common practice, the spread of
customer data collection and analysis to other social and technology sectors is emerging as a powerful tool.
This will enable firms to segregate their potential customers into compartments: individuals in the market
for a product or service offered by the firm, and current consumers of comparable products or services offered
by competing firms.
With this capability in place, firms may wish to tailor advertising campaigns so that the effort (allocation
of advertising expenditures) towards customers of other firms may differ from the effort towards uncom-
mitted customers. This may provide a more efficient distribution of advertising expenditures, and may be
advantageous in a number of situations, including a highly competitive niche product market in which sales
are gained primarily from customers of other firms, as well as the case where sales are gained primarily from
the market potential. This model may be useful in markets such as cable and satellite television service,
wireless communication providers, security services, or even political campaigns. This model can also rep-
resent a single firm that offers multiple mutually-exclusive tiers or levels within a single product line, such
as lawn care service or wireless communication providers. In this case, the firm may decide (for example,
through targeted mailings) to advertise more aggressively toward customers of the lower-tier services (with
advertisements attempting to convince existing customers to upgrade) as opposed to potential customers, or
vice-versa.
Dynamic models of advertising competition in the context of differential equations and dynamic games
have been a rich focus of study over the last sixty years. Kimball [20] employed the Lanchester [22] combat
model to represent two firms competing for market share via advertising efforts. The model of Vidale and
Wolfe [32] viewed the time rate of change of sales rate as a function of advertising expenditure and sales
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decay. Several related models and contributions are found in [23], [7], [3], [25], [15], [2], [1], [28], [30], [17],
[5], [21], [24], [29], and [18]. The reader is referred to [31], [6], and [14] for comprehensive surveys of work
in dynamic advertising models, as well as [16], [26], [4], [19] for advertising models in a differential game
setting. Of note, [13] extended the advertising model of [27], based on a stock of goodwill, to the situation
where differing advertising policies are prescribed towards potential customers and existing customers.
Often the study of these dynamic models is undertaken within the setting of a non-cooperative differential
game in which competing firms wish to employ strategies that maximize a profit objective function. In this
scenario, firms set their advertising strategy by allocating a particular amount of effort (usually in the form
of advertising expenditures), and this effort is considered to be the control variable. A primary objective of
the analysis of these games is to determine Nash equilibrium, which defines the strategies for all firms that
are optimal in the sense that no single firm stands to gain from unilaterally modifying their own strategy
(i.e., changing their own control). This analysis can lead to an open-loop Nash equilibrium, in which the
control variable depends only on time, or a closed-loop equilibrium, in which the control is also dependent
on the current state of the system (the sales rates/market shares of all firms in the competitive market).
This makes a closed-loop solution more attractive, as its dependence on the current state of the system
allows for continual adjustment of strategy, as opposed to the open-loop strategy that is determined at the
outset of the time horizon. However, computation of a closed-loop strategy is generally more difficult than
an open-loop strategy and often requires the solution of boundary-value problems in ordinary or partial
differential equations.
As many of these models comprise systems of nonlinear differential equations, it is also useful to determine
if steady states of the system exist and analyze their stability properties. Further insight into strategic
decision-making can also be found by making certain assumptions about model parameters and optimization
with respect to certain variables.
The motivation for the work presented here arises mainly from [9], [33] and [12]. Fruchter [9] extends
the Lanchester-based model in [11] and [8] to an expanding market size, allowing for a decreasing market
potential available to all firms. This was extended to the oligopoly setting where each competing firm
offered a line of products in [10]. Wang and Wu [33] present an extension of the duopoly Vidale-Wolfe model
to an expanding market with sales decay. Closed-loop Nash equilibria were derived in both [9] and [33].
Fruchter and Zhang [12] consider a model that divides customers into two categories: repeat customers and
customers of other firms. This model is analyzed in a duopoly setting in which firms allocate advertising
effort differently between these customer categories.
However, none of the aforementioned Lanchester-based models existing in the literature allow for differing
advertising policies towards uncommitted consumers and competitors’ customers. In this work two dynamic
advertising models in an oligopoly setting are presented. In a nontargeted scheme, a firm does not discern
between competitors’ customers and the untapped market potential. This results in a model where the only
decision, or control, is the advertising expenditure. However, in the new targeted scheme, a differentiation
is made between competitors’ customers and the market potential, and the firm must determine the best
course of action, i.e., the best allocation of expenditures/effort toward these two groups. Both models allow
for sales/market share decay through cancellation. Jørgensen and Sigue´ [18] recently presented a model
which allows for a different advertising policy towards competitors’ customers (offensive advertising) and
the market potential (generic advertising), however is it assumed that generic advertising may benefit all
firms participating in the market.
The nontargeted model we describe is an extension of the Lanchester-based oligopoly model of an ex-
panding market in [9] to include sales/market share decay. In addition for allowing a variable (as opposed to
nonincreasing) market potential, the cancellation rate also allows for an interpretation of customer retention
through a reciprocal relationship. These models can easily be extended to include effort and effectiveness
parameters of customer retention activities. For this model, closed-loop strategies, based on the solution of
a two-point boundary value problem, are derived and shown to form Nash equilibria. By extending [9] to
allow for cancellation, the nontargeted model can also be viewed as an extension of the duopoly model in
[33] to the Lanchester sales-rate oligopoly setting, providing somewhat of a convergence of the Vidale-Wolfe
and Lanchester models.
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Table 1. Summary of Related Works
Fruchter Fruchter Jørgensen
and Wang and and and This
Kalisch [11] Fruchter [8] Fruchter [9] Wu [33] Zhang [12] Sigue´[18] work
Model Type Duopoly Oligopoly Oligopoly Duopoly Duopoly Duopoly Oligopoly
Sales Decay No No No Yes No No Yes
Effort To
Market
Potential
Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Effort To
Competitors’
Customers
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Targeting No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Time Horizon Infinite Infinite Infinite Finite Infinite Finite Finite
Open-loop
NE
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Closed-loop
NE
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The nontargeted model is then modified by allowing for a different allocation of effort across the market
potential and competitors’ customers. This targeted model also allows for varying effectiveness to effort
ratios for the two submarkets. Indeed, the targeted model leads to a more complex mathematical problem
and is somewhat unwieldy for an increasing number of firms when describing closed-loop Nash equilibria,
as well as the steady-state sales rates for given sets of parameters. Thus the derivation of closed-loop
strategies is limited to the duopoly case, and the steady-states are derived when there are two or three
competing firms. Additionally, analysis of the behavior of the model in specific settings provides insight
when addressing questions that a firm may be faced with when determining an allocation of advertising
effort across these two submarkets. A particular application of interest is the situation when a candidate
in a political campaign is able to discern the voters committed to his/her opponent and must determine
the best allocation of advertising expenditures in a fixed budget. Indeed, a recent announcement detailed a
partnership between satellite television providers for developing a common database of subscriber data with
the intent of implementation of addressable advertising for political campaigns.1 In this situation a political
party or candidate wishing to purchase advertising may be faced with the question: it is better to advertise
more aggressively to perceived supporters of an opponent or to undecided voters?
To summarize the contributions presented here relative to related works, the Table 1 details this contri-
bution of this manuscript and related works. In the table, “Targeting” represents whether or not the model
allows for a differing allocation of effort across customer categories. A recent summary of all related dynamic
models of advertising competition is presented in the Online Appendix of [14].
2. The Nontargeted Advertising Model
Consider an industry with N ≥ 2 competing firms. We assume that each firm uses advertising as their
major marketing instrument to increase sales, which is done by convincing other customers to switch firms
or by gaining prospects from the market potential.
For n = 1, 2, . . . , N , let xn(t) represent firm n’s market share at time t with the assumption that 0 ≤
xn(t) ≤ 1 for all time t ∈ [0,∞). By convention we assume that the advertising expenditures result in
1See http://adage.com/article/media/dish-directv-team-addressable-ad-efforts/291303/
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diminishing returns in the way of advertising effort, thus we let u2n(t) represent the advertising expenditure
of firm n so that un(t) is the advertising effort. The parameter ρk the advertising effectiveness to effort
ratio (thus ρkuk(t) represents the advertising effectiveness of firm k’s campaign). Let m represents the total
possible sales of the market, so it satisfies
(2.1) m =
n∑
k=1
sk(t) + ε(t),
where ε(t) represents the market potential at time t. Whenm = 1, as will often be assumed in the applications
discussed later, sk represents a market share. Note that the market potential satisfies
(2.2) ε˙(t) = −
n∑
k=1
s˙k(t).
The oligopoly advertising model with market expansion in [9] is given by
(2.3) s˙k(t) = ρkuk(t) (m− sk(t))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gain from advertising
towards non-customers
− sk(t)
n∑
j=1,j 6=k
ρjuj(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Loss from competitors’
advertising efforts
,
for k = 1, . . . , n, as the first term on the right hand side represents the gain in sales from the market potential
and customers of other firms, and the second term represents the sales lost to competitors’ advertising efforts.
It is assumed that sk(t), ρk, uk(t) are all positive for all t. To incorporate sales decay, or cancellation, into
the model let ck(t) ≥ 0 represent the rate at which firm k loses customers to the market potential. Then the
nontargeted advertising model is given by
(2.4) s˙k(t) = ρkuk(t) (m− sk(t))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gain from advertising
towards non-customers
− sk(t)
n∑
j=1,j 6=k
ρjuj(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Loss from competitors’
advertising efforts
− ck(t)sk(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Loss from
cancellation
.
In light of (2.2) we have that the market potential satisfies the differential equation
ε˙(t) =
n∑
k=1
ck(t)sk(t)− ε(t)
n∑
k=1
ρkuk(t),
and, as opposed to the model of [9], does not indicate that the market potential is monotonic decreasing.
The model (2.4) can also be written as
(2.5) s˙k(t) = ρkuk(t)m− sk(t)
ck(t) + n∑
j=1
ρjuj(t)
 .
Given initial values sk(0) = s
0
k, the system of first-order equations (2.5) for k = 1, . . . , n has the solution
(2.6) sk(t) =
[
s0k +
∫ t
0
mρkuk(τ)e
ψk(τ) dτ
]
e−ψk(t),
where
ψk(t) =
∫ t
0
ck(τ) + n∑
j=1
ρjuj(τ)
 dτ.
Remark 2.1. While there is no guarantee that limt→∞ sk(t) > 0, we have that sk(T ) > 0 for any finite time
horizon [0, T ]. Thus a finite time horizon is considered in the discussion of the differential game and Nash
equilibrium in Section 2.1.
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Remark 2.2. When (2.4) is written in terms of firm k’s market share xk = sk/m, the duopoly case reduces
to the model of [33].
2.1. Nash Equilibrium. In this section we discuss the derivation of Nash equilibrium strategies for the
nontargeted advertising model over a finite time horizon. Assume the discount rate r is uniform for all firms
and let xk = sk/m. Then the profit objective function is given by
(2.7) Πk =
∫ T
0
(
Qkxk(t)− u2k(t)
)
e−rt dt,
where Qk = qkm and qk is the gross profit rate. The differential game is characterized as follows: the
problem of oligopolist k, k = 1, . . . , n is to find the control uk such that
(2.8) max
uk
Πk(u1, . . . , uk, . . . , un) = max
uk
∫ T
0
(
Qkxk(t)− u2k(t)
)
e−rt dt,
subject to
(2.9) x˙k = ρkuk − xk
ck + n∑
j=1
ρjuj
 , xk(0) = x0k.
The control uk is admissible provided 0 ≤ uk < ∞. For a Nash equilibrium closed-loop strategy, we must
find u∗k(t, x1, . . . , xn, x
0
1, . . . , x
0
n) such that
(2.10) Πk(u
∗
1, . . . , u
∗
k, . . . , u
∗
n) ≥ Πk(u∗1, . . . , u∗k−1, uk, u∗k+1 . . . , u∗n) ∀uk, k = 1, . . . , n.
Theorem 2.3. Assume x∗k and ϕk, k = 1, . . . , n, solve the following two-point boundary value problem of
2n equations:
x˙k =
1
2
ρ2kQkϕk(t)(1− xk)ert − xk
2ck + n∑
j=1
ρ2jQjϕj(t)e
rt(1− xj)
 , xk(0) = x0k,(2.11)
ϕ˙k = ckϕk(t) +
1
2
ϕk(t)
n∑
j=1
ρ2jQjϕj(t)(1− xj)ert − e−rt, ϕk(T ) = 0.(2.12)
Then the functions
(2.13) u∗k =
1
2
ρkQkϕk(t)e
rt(1− xk), k = 1 . . . , n,
where the xk satisfy (2.9), form a global Nash equilibrium closed-loop strategy for the differential game
(2.8)–(2.9), and the functions
(2.14) uOLk =
1
2
ρkQkϕk(t)e
rt(1− x∗k), k = 1 . . . , n,
form a open-loop strategy for the differential game (2.8)–(2.9).
Proof. The argument is an extension of the proof of Theorem 1 in [9] and utilizes the technique introduced
in [11] to show the closed-loop strategies are optimal. The current value Hamiltonian of firm k is given by
(2.15) Hk(xk, u1, . . . , un, λk, t) = Qkxk − u2k + λk,kx˙k +
n∑
j=1
j 6=k
λk,j x˙j
where λk,j are the costate variables. We have that ∂Hk/∂uk = 0 precisely when
(2.16) − 2uk + ρk
λk,k(1− xk)− n∑
j=1
j 6=k
λk,jxj
 = 0.
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for k = 1 . . . , n. The optimality conditions are then given by (2.16) and
λ˙k,k = rλk,k − ∂Hk
∂xk
= rλk,k −Qk + λk,k
ck + n∑
j=1
ρjuj
 , ∀k = 1, . . . , n,(2.17)
λ˙k,j = rλk,j − ∂Hk
∂xj
= λk,j
(
r + cj +
n∑
i=1
ρiui
)
, ∀k, j = 1, . . . , n, j 6= k,(2.18)
with transversality conditions
(2.19) λk,j(T )xk(T ) = 0, ∀k, j = 1, . . . , n,
that imply λk,j(T ) = 0 for all k and j (see Remark 2.1). Now (2.18) and (2.19) imply that λk,j = 0 for all
j 6= k. Then allowing λk := λk,k, (2.16) implies
(2.20) uk =
1
2
ρkλk(1− xk).
This is the same control uk found in [9]. Then, substituting (2.20) into x˙k = ∂Hk/∂λk and (2.17) we obtain
the two-point boundary value problem with 2n equations given by: for k = 1, . . . , n,
x˙k =
1
2
ρ2kλk(1− xk)− xk
2ck + n∑
j=1
ρ2jλj(1− xj)
 , xk(0) =x0k,(2.21)
λ˙k = λk
r + ck + 1
2
n∑
j=1
ρ2jλj(1− xj)
−Qk. λk(T ) = 0.(2.22)
Make a change of variable via the definition ϕk(t) = e
−rtλk(t)/Qk, k = 1, . . . , n. As opposed to [9], in
which the system of 2n equations can be reduced to n + 1 equations, (2.21)–(2.22) cannot. However, the
substitution for λk is still useful as will be demonstrated later. Then (2.21)–(2.22) can be written as
x˙k =
1
2
ρ2kQkϕ(t)(1− xk)ert − xk
2ck + n∑
j=1
ρ2jQjϕ(t)e
rt(1− xj)
 , xk(0) =x0k,(2.23)
ϕ˙k = ckϕk(t) +
1
2
ϕk(t)
n∑
j=1
ρ2jQjϕj(t)(1− xj)ert − e−rt, ϕk(T ) = 0.(2.24)
Let x∗k, ϕk, k = 1, . . . , n solve (2.23)–(2.24) and define u
∗
k and u
OL
k as in (2.13) and (2.14), respectively. The
objective is to find an expression such that, when added to Πk, demonstrates that
Πk(u
∗
1, . . . , u
∗
k−1, u
∗
k, u
∗
k+1, . . . , u
∗
n) ≥ Πk(u∗1, . . . , u∗k−1, uk, u∗k+1, . . . , u∗n).
We have ∫ T
0
d
dt
(Qkϕk(t)xk(t)) dt = Qkϕk(t)xk(T )
∣∣∣∣T
0
= −Qkϕk(0)x0k,
so that
(2.25) Qkϕk(0)x
0
k +
∫ T
0
d
dt
(Qkϕk(t)xk(t)) dt = 0
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Using (2.9), (2.24), and (2.13), we have
d
dt
(Qkϕkxk) = Qkϕ˙kxk +Qkϕkx˙k
= Qkxk
ckϕk + 1
2
ϕk
n∑
j=1
ρ2jQjϕj(1− x∗j )ert − e−rt
+Qkϕk
ρkuk − xk
ck + n∑
j=1
ρjuj

= Qkxkckϕk −Qkxke−rt + 1
2
Qkϕkxk
n∑
j=1
ρ2jQjϕj(1− x∗j )ert +Qkϕkρkuk
−Qkϕkxkck −Qkϕkxk
n∑
j=1
ρjuj
=
1
2
Qkϕkxk
n∑
j=1
ρ2jQjϕj(1− x∗j )ert +Qkϕkρkuk −Qkϕkxk
n∑
j=1
ρjuj −Qkxke−rt
= Qkϕkρk(uk − uOLk + uOLk ) +Qkϕkxk
n∑
j=1
ρj
12ρjQjϕjert(1− x∗j )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=uOLj
−uj
−Qkxke−rt
= Qkϕkρk(uk − uOLk ) +QkϕkρkuOLk −Qkϕkxk
n∑
j=1
ρj
(
uj − uOLj
)−Qkxke−rt
= Qkϕkρk(uk − uOLk ) +QkϕkρkuOLk −Qkxke−rt −Qkϕkxk
ρk(uk − uOLk ) + n∑
j=1
j 6=k
ρj
(
uj − uOLj
)
= (uk − uOLk )Qkϕkρk(1− xk) +QkϕkρkuOLk −Qkxke−rt −Qkϕkxk
n∑
j=1
j 6=k
ρj
(
uj − uOLj
)
= (uk − uOLk )
1
2
ρkQkϕke
rt(1− xk)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=u∗k
(2e−rt) +QkϕkρkuOLk −Qkxke−rt
+ 2
(
1
2
)(
ρk
ρk
)
Qkϕk
(
ert
) (
e−rt
)
(1− xk − 1)
n∑
j=1
j 6=k
ρj
(
uj − uOLj
)
=
[
2(uk − uOLk )u∗k + ρkQkϕkertuOLk −Qkxk
]
e−rt
+
 2ρk
12ρkQkϕkert(1− xk)︸ ︷︷ ︸
u∗k
 n∑
j=1
j 6=k
ρj
(
uj − uOLj
)−Qkϕkert n∑
j=1
j 6=k
ρj
(
uj − uOLj
) e−rt
=
[
2uku
∗
k − 2uOLk u∗k + ρkQkϕkertuOLk −Qkxk
+
2u∗k
ρk
n∑
j=1
j 6=k
ρj
(
uj − uOLj
)−Qkϕkert n∑
j=1
j 6=k
ρj
(
uj − uOLj
)]
e−rt.(2.26)
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Then (2.25) and (2.26) together give
Πk(u1, . . . , un) = Πk(u1, . . . , un) + 0
= Πk(u1, . . . , un) +Qkϕ(0)x
0
k +
∫ T
0
d
dt
(Qkϕk(t)xk(t)) dt
= Qkϕk(0)x
0
k +
∫ T
0
(
Qkxk − u2k
)
e−rt dt+
∫ T
0
d
dt
(Qkϕk(t)xk(t)) dt
= Qkϕk(0)x
0
k +
∫ T
0
[
2uku
∗
k − 2uOLk u∗k − u2k
]
e−rt dt
+
∫ T
0
ρkQkϕkertuOLk + 2u∗kρk
n∑
j=1
j 6=k
ρj
(
uj − uOLj
)−Qkϕkert n∑
j=1
j 6=k
ρj
(
uj − uOLj
) e−rt dt.(2.27)
Note that the second integral is independent of the kth argument of Π. Then we have
(2.28) Πk(u
∗
1, . . . , u
∗
k−1, u
∗
k, u
∗
k+1, . . . , u
∗
n) = Qkϕk(0)x
0
k +
∫ T
0
[
u∗k
2 − 2uOLk u∗k
]
e−rt dt
+
∫ T
0
ρkQkϕkertuOLk + 2u∗kρk
n∑
j=1
j 6=k
ρj
(
u∗j − uOLj
)−Qkϕkert n∑
j=1
j 6=k
ρj
(
u∗j − uOLj
) e−rt dt,
and
(2.29) Πk(u
∗
1, . . . , u
∗
k−1, uk, u
∗
k+1, . . . , u
∗
n) = Qkϕk(0)x
0
k +
∫ T
0
[
2uku
∗
k − 2uOLk u∗k − u2k
]
e−rt dt
+
∫ T
0
ρkQkϕkertuOLk + 2u∗kρk
n∑
j=1
j 6=k
ρj
(
u∗j − uOLj
)−Qkϕkert n∑
j=1
j 6=k
ρj
(
u∗j − uOLj
) e−rt dt.
Subtracting (2.29) from (2.28) gives
(2.30) Πk(u
∗
1, . . . , u
∗
k−1, u
∗
k, u
∗
k+1, . . . , u
∗
n)−Πk(u∗1, . . . , u∗k−1, uk, u∗k+1, . . . , u∗n)
=
∫ T
0
[
u∗k
2 − 2uku∗k + u2k
]
e−rt dt =
∫ T
0
(u∗k − uk)2 e−rt dt ≥ 0.
This shows that the closed-loop strategy (2.13) is a Nash equilibrium. 
We remark that, if ck = 0 for all k, then ϕk(t) = ϕ(t) is independent of k and the two-point boundary
value problem of 2n equations (2.11)–(2.12) reduces to the same n + 1 equations of Theorem 1 of [9] and
therefore yields the same closed-loop strategy.
While computation of analytic solutions to the two-point boundary value problem in (2.11)–(2.12) is
generally infeasible, numerical solutions can easily be obtained. In Figure 1, two different solutions are
computed for the duopoly case. In both computations, the discount rate is taken to be r = 0.1 and the
profit rates Q1 = Q2 = 1. We assume that firm 2’s effectiveness to effort ratio is 20% better than firm 1
(ρ1 = 1.0, ρ2 = 1.2) and that both firms have an identical initial market share of 40%. The figure on the left
is the solution for c1 = c2 = 0, and the figure on the right is with c1 = 0.1, c2 = 0.2. It is easy to see that in
the absence of sales decay, the market potential tends to zero, while there is a substantial market potential
in the case with nonzero sales decay. In both cases, the superior effectiveness of firm 2’s campaign leads to
a leading market share, even when the sales decay rate is higher.
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Figure 1. Solutions to (2.11)–(2.12) and closed-loop strategies (2.13)
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
Market Shares and Closed−Loop Strategies, c1=c2=0
time
 
 
x1
x2
u1
u2
(a) c1 = c2 = 0
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
Market Shares and Closed−Loop Strategies, c1=0.1, c2=0.2
time
 
 
x1
x2
u1
u2
(b) c1 = 0.1, c2 = 0.2
2.2. Analysis of Steady States of the Nontargeted Model. For analysis of steady states of the non-
targeted advertising model, the parameters ui, ρi, and ci are all assumed to be positive constants. For
notational simplicity the dependence on t of si will be suppressed. The steady state solutions are found by
setting the right-hand sides of (2.5) to zero for k = 1, . . . , n, i.e.,
(2.31) ρkuk(t)m− sk(t)
ck(t) + n∑
j=1
ρjuj(t)
 = 0, k = 1, . . . , n.
Lemma 2.4. Let
(2.32) Un =
n∑
j=1
ρjuj .
Then the system (2.31) has a unique solution given by
(2.33) sk =
mρkuk
ck + Un
.
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Existence and uniqueness of the solution are guaranteed by the assumptions on the parameters. In
this case, it is clear that the long-term sales of firm k are dependent on its cancellation rate and the
advertising effectiveness of all firms - an increase in advertising effectiveness by any other firm or an increase
in cancellation rate result in a decrease in sales. The equilibrium market potential is given by
ε = m−
n∑
k=1
sk = m
(
1−
n∑
k=1
ρkuk
ck + Un
)
.
As s˙k depends only on the parameters and sk itself, the Jacobian J of the system (2.5) for k = 1, . . . , n is
diagonal with each diagonal entry
(2.34) Jii = −ci −
n∑
j=1
ρjuj ,
which implies that the eigenvalues of the system are always negative. Thus the equilibrium point (2.33) is
asymptotically stable.
3. The Targeted Advertising Model
The targeted advertising model is constructed by allowing firm k to employ differing advertising campaigns
towards the market potential and customers of other firms. Let vk(t) > 0 be the advertising effort of firm
k towards the market potential and let σk > 0 be the corresponding effectiveness to effort ratio. Then the
targeted advertising model of firm k’s sales at time t is
(3.1) s˙k(t) = σkvk(t)ε(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gain from
market potential
+ ρkuk(t)
n∑
j=1,j 6=k
sj(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gain from
competitors’ customers
− sk(t)
ck(t) + n∑
j=1,j 6=k
ρjuj(t)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Loss from competitors’ advertising
efforts and cancellation
,
where the first term on the right hand side represents the gain in sales from the market potential, the second
term represents the gain in sales from customers of other firms, and the third term represents the decrease
in sales from cancellations and the cumulative efforts of other firms. Using the definition of the market
potential (2.1) we can write (3.1) as
(3.2) s˙k(t) = σkvk(t)
m− n∑
j=1
sj(t)
+ ρkuk(t) n∑
j=1,j 6=k
sj(t)− sk(t)
ck(t) + n∑
j=1,j 6=k
ρjuj(t)
 .
It is also useful to view (3.2) as
(3.3) s˙k(t) = σkvk(t)m+ (ρkuk(t)− σkvk(t))
n∑
j=1,j 6=k
sj(t)− sk(t)
σkvk(t) + ck(t) + n∑
j=1,j 6=k
ρjuj(t)
 .
Remark 3.1. If uk = vk and ρk = σk for all k then (3.3) reduces to the nontargeted advertising model (2.4).
3.1. Nash Equilibrium. As in Section 2.1, we let xk = sk/m and consider the profit objective function
given by
(3.4) Πk =
∫ T
0
(
Qkxk(t)− (u2k(t) + v2k(t))
)
e−rt dt,
where Qk = qkm and qk is the gross profit rate. The differential game is characterized as follows: the
problem of oligopolist k, k = 1, . . . , n is to find the control uk such that
(3.5) max
uk,vk
Πk((u1, v1), . . . , (un, vn)) = max
uk,vk
∫ T
0
(
Qkxk(t)− (u2k(t) + v2k(t))
)
e−rt dt,
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subject to
(3.6) x˙k = σkvk
1− n∑
j=1
xj
+ ρkuk n∑
j=1,j 6=k
xj − xk
ck + n∑
j=1,j 6=k
ρjuj
 .
The controls uk and vk are admissible provided 0 ≤ uk, vk <∞.
For ease of presentation, we give the closed-loop Nash equilibrium strategies for the targeted duopoly
modeled by
x˙1 = σ1v1(1− x1 − x2) + ρ1u1x2 − x1(c1 + ρ2u2),(3.7)
x˙2 = σ2v2(1− x1 − x2) + ρ2u2x1 − x2(c2 + ρ1u1).(3.8)
In this case, a global Nash equilibrium strategy is a pair (u∗1, v
∗
1), (u
∗
2, v
∗
2) such that
Π1((u
∗
1, v
∗
1), ((u
∗
2, v
∗
2)) ≥ Π1((u1, v∗1), ((u∗2, v∗2)),(3.9)
Π1((u
∗
1, v
∗
1), ((u
∗
2, v
∗
2)) ≥ Π1((u∗1, v1), ((u∗2, v∗2)),(3.10)
Π2((u
∗
1, v
∗
1), ((u
∗
2, v
∗
2)) ≥ Π2((u∗1, v∗1), ((u2, v∗2)),(3.11)
Π2((u
∗
1, v
∗
1), ((u
∗
2, v
∗
2)) ≥ Π2((u∗1, v∗1), ((u∗2, v2)),(3.12)
for all admissible u1, u2, v1, v2. The closed-loop Nash equilibrium strategies are found given the solvability
of a two-point boundary value problem with six equations and six unknowns.
Theorem 3.2. Let x∗k, ϕk,j, k, j = 1, 2, satisfy the following two-point boundary value problem:
x˙∗k =
1
2
σ2kQkϕk,k(1− x∗1 − x∗2)2ert +
1
2
ρ2kQk(ϕk,k − ϕk,j)x∗j 2ert
−x∗k
(
ck +
1
2
ρ2jQj(ϕj,j − ϕj,k)x∗kert
)
,(3.13)
ϕ˙k,k = ϕk,k
(
ck +
1
2
σ2kQkϕk,k(1− x∗1 − x∗2)2ert
)
+
1
2
σ2jQjϕk,jϕj,j(1− x∗1 − x∗2)ert
+
1
2
(ϕk,k − ϕj,j)ρ2jQj(ϕj,j − ϕj,k)x∗jert − e−rt,(3.14)
ϕ˙k,j =
1
2
σ2kQkϕ
2
k,k(1− x∗1 − x∗2)ert −
1
2
ρ2kQk(ϕk,k − ϕk,j)2x∗jert
+ϕk,j
(
cj +
1
2
σ2jQjϕj,j(1− x∗1 − x∗2)ert
)
,(3.15)
where xk(0) = x
0
k, ϕk,j(T ) = 0, j, k = 1, 2. Then
(3.16) u∗k =
1
2
Qkρk(ϕk,k − ϕk,j)xjert, v∗k =
1
2
Qkσkϕk,k(1− x1 − x2)ert,
for k, j = 1, 2, j 6= k, where the xk satisfy (3.7)–(3.8), form global closed-loop Nash equilibrium strategies for
(3.5)–(3.6) (with n = 2).
Proof. The current value Hamiltonians of firms 1 and 2 are given by
H1 = Q1x1 − u21 − v21 + λ1,1x˙1 + λ1,2x˙2,(3.17)
H2 = Q2x2 − u22 − v22 + λ2,2x˙2 + λ2,1x˙1.(3.18)
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where λk,j are the costate variables. Using (3.7)–(3.8) we have
− 2u1 + λ1,1ρ1x2 − λ1,2ρ1x2 = 0 =⇒ u1 = 1
2
ρ1(λ1,1 − λ1,2)x2,(3.19)
−2v1 + λ1,1σ1(1− x1 − x2) = 0 =⇒ v1 = 1
2
σ1λ1,1(1− x1 − x2),(3.20)
−2u2 + λ2,2ρ2x1 − λ2,1ρ2x1 = 0 =⇒ u2 = 1
2
ρ2(λ2,2 − λ2,1)x1,(3.21)
−2v2 + λ2,2σ2(1− x1 − x2) = 0 =⇒ v2 = 1
2
σ2λ2,2(1− x1 − x2).(3.22)
The optimality conditions are then given by (3.19)–(3.22) and the four equations
λ˙1,1 = λ1,1 (r + c1 + σ1v1 + ρ2u2) + λ1,2 (σ2v2 − ρ2u2)−Q1,(3.23)
λ˙1,2 = λ1,1 (σ1v1 − ρ1u1) + λ1,2 (r + c2 + σ2v2 + ρ1u1) ,(3.24)
λ˙2,1 = λ2,2 (σ2v2 − ρ2u2) + λ2,1 (r + c1 + σ1v1 + ρ2u2) ,(3.25)
λ˙2,2 = λ2,2 (r + c2 + σ2v2 + ρ1u1) + λ2,1 (σ1v1 − ρ1u1)−Q2,(3.26)
and the transversality conditions imply that λk,j(T ) = 0 for all k, j = 1, 2. Note that, as opposed to the
proof of Theorem 2.3, the transversality conditions do not directly imply λ1,2 ≡ 0 and λ2,1 ≡ 0. Make
the substitution ϕk,j(t) = λk,j(t)e
−rt/Qk, and the two-point boundary value problem (3.13)–(3.15) is then
obtained. Letting x∗1, x
∗
2, ϕ1,1, ϕ1,2, ϕ2,1, ϕ2,2 solve (3.13)–(3.15), define the open-loop strategies
(3.27) uOLk =
1
2
Qkρkx
∗
j (ϕk,k − ϕk,j)ert, vOLk =
1
2
Qkσkϕk,k(1− x∗1 − x∗2)ert.
and the closed-loop strategies (3.16). As in the proof of Theorem 2.3, the demonstration of the conditions
(3.9)–(3.12) is accomplished by adding particular equations to Πk. First, note that
(3.28)
∫ T
0
d
dt
(Q1(ϕ1,1 − ϕ1,2)x1) dt+Q1(ϕ1,1(0)− ϕ1,2(0))x01 = 0.
Then we have, using (3.13)–(3.15) and (3.7)–(3.8),
d
dt
(Q1(ϕ1,1 − ϕ1,2)x1) = Q1(ϕ˙1,1 − ϕ˙1,2)x1 +Q1(ϕ1,1 − ϕ1,2)x˙1
= Q1x1
(
ϕ1,1c1 − ϕ1,2c2 + (ϕ1,1 − ϕ1,2)ρ1uOL1 + (ϕ1,1 − ϕ1,2)ρ2uOL2 − e−rt
)
+Q1(ϕ1,1 − ϕ1,2) (σ1v1(1− x1 − x2) + ρ1u1x2 − x1(c1 + ρ2u2))
= ρ1Q1(ϕ1,1 − ϕ1,2)x2u1 + fˆu1(uOL1 , v1, vOL1 , u2, uOL2 , ϕ1,1, ϕ1,2)−Q1x1e−rt
= 2u∗1u1e
−rt + fˆu1(u
OL
1 , v1, v
OL
1 , u2, u
OL
2 , ϕ1,1, ϕ1,2)−Q1x1e−rt,(3.29)
where fˆu1(u
OL
1 , v1, v
OL
1 , u2, u
OL
2 , ϕ1,1, ϕ1,2) is independent of u1. Then, adding the left hand side of (3.28) to
Π1 and using (3.29), we have for any admissible u1,
Π1((u
∗
1, v
∗
1), ((u
∗
2, v
∗
2)) − Π1((u1, v∗1), ((u∗2, v∗2))
=
∫ T
0
[
Q1x1 − u∗12 − v∗12 + 2u∗12 + fˆu1ert −Q1x1
]
e−rt dt
−
∫ T
0
[
Q1x1 − u12 − v∗12 + 2u∗1u1 + fˆu1ert −Q1x1
]
e−rt dt
=
∫ T
0
[
u∗1
2 − 2u∗1u1 + u21
]
e−rt dt
=
∫ T
0
(u∗1 − u1)2 e−rt dt ≥ 0,(3.30)
DYNAMIC MODELING OF NONTARGETED AND TARGETED ADVERTISING STRATEGIES IN AN OLIGOPOLY 13
which proves condition (3.9). To prove (3.10), we use
(3.31)
∫ T
0
d
dt
(Q1ϕ1,1x1) dt+Q1ϕ1,1(0)x
0
1 = 0.
Then we have, using (3.13)–(3.15) and (3.7)–(3.8),
d
dt
(Q1ϕ1,1x1) = Q1ϕ˙1,1x1 +Q1ϕ1,1x˙1
= Q1x1
(
ϕ1,1
(
c1 + σ1v
OL
1 + ρ2u
OL
2
)
+ ϕ1,2
(
σ2v
OL
2 − ρ2uOL2
)− e−rt)
+Q1ϕ1,1 (σ1v1(1− x1 − x2) + ρ1u1x2 − x1(c1 + ρ2u2))
= σ1Q1ϕ1,1(1− x1 − x2) + fˆv1(u1, vOL1 , u2, uOL2 , vOL2 , ϕ1,1, ϕ1,2)−Q1x1e−rt
= 2v∗1v1e
−rt + fˆv1(u1, v
OL
1 , u2, u
OL
2 , v
OL
2 , ϕ1,1, ϕ1,2)−Q1x1e−rt,(3.32)
where fˆv1(u1, v
OL
1 , u2, u
OL
2 , v
OL
2 , ϕ1,1, ϕ1,2) is independent of v1. Proceeding as we did above, we see that
(3.31) and (3.32) imply, for any admissible v1,
Π1((u
∗
1, v
∗
1), ((u
∗
2, v
∗
2)) − Π1((u∗1, v1), ((u∗2, v∗2))
=
∫ T
0
[
Q1x1 − u∗12 − v∗12 + 2v∗12 + fˆv1ert −Q1x1
]
e−rt dt
−
∫ T
0
[
Q1x1 − u∗12 − v12 + 2v∗1v1 + fˆv1ert −Q1x1
]
e−rt dt
=
∫ T
0
[
v∗1
2 − 2v∗1v1 + v21
]
e−rt dt
=
∫ T
0
(v∗1 − v1)2 e−rt dt ≥ 0,(3.33)
which proves condition (3.10). Conditions (3.11) and (3.12) are shown in the same manner, completing the
proof of Theorem 3.2. 
Again, computation of analytic solutions to the two-point boundary value problem in (3.13)–(3.15) is
generally infeasible. In Figure 2, two different solutions are computed for the duopoly case. As in the
nontargeted simulations, the discount rate is taken to be r = 0.1 and the profit rates Q1 = Q2 = 1 and firm
2’s effectiveness to effort ratio towards competitors’ customers is 20% better than firm 1 (ρ1 = 1.0, ρ2 = 1.2).
Additionally, we assume that firm 1’s campaign is more effective towards the market potential (σ1 = 1.2, σ2 =
1.0) and that both firms have an identical initial market share of 40%. The figure on the left is the solution
for c1 = c2 = 0, and the figure on the right is with c1 = 0.1, c2 = 0.2. It is easy to see that in the absence
of sales decay, the market potential tends to zero, while there is a substantial market potential in the case
with nonzero sales decay. As opposed to the nontargeted case, these two scenarios produce different firms in
the market share lead. In the absence of sales decay, initially firm 1 takes the lead as its campaign towards
market potential is more effective, however as market potential shrinks, firm 2 overtakes the lead as its
campaign towards customers of firm 1 is more effective, resulting in a leading long-run market share. When
sales decay is introduced however, firm 1 maintains the leading market share throughout the time horizon.
This leads to the observation that sales decay rates play an important role in the optimal strategies of a
targeted advertising policy.
3.2. Analysis of Steady States of the Targeted Model. The derivation of steady states for the targeted
advertising model is significantly more complicated than the nontargeted case. In addition to the assumptions
in section 2.2, assume ρk and vk are constant. The duopoly case is given by the equations
s˙1 = σ1v1m+ (ρ1u1 − σ1v1) s2 − s1 (c1 + σ1v1 + ρ2u2) ,(3.34)
s˙2 = σ2v2m+ (ρ2u2 − σ2v2) s1 − s2 (c2 + σ2v2 + ρ1u1) .(3.35)
The steady states are found by setting s˙1 = s˙2 = 0 in (3.34)-(3.35).
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Figure 2. Solutions to (3.13)–(3.15) and closed-loop strategies (3.16)
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Lemma 3.3. Let Vn =
∑n
k=1 σkvk and
(3.36) D2 = σ1v1 (c2 + U2) + σ2v2 (c1 + U2) + c1ρ1u1 + c2ρ2u2 + c1c2.
Then the unique steady state of (3.34)-(3.35) with constant parameters is given by
(3.37) s1 =
m (V2ρ1u1 + c2σ1v1)
D2
, s2 =
m (V2ρ2u2 + c1σ2v2)
D2
.
Examining the numerator of s1 in (3.37) we see that
(3.38) m (V2ρ1u1 + c2σ1v1) = m (σ1v1 (ρ1u1 + c2) + ρ1u1σ2v2) .
Both sides of (3.38) give interpretations of the contributions firm 1’s long term sales behavior. The left
side of (3.38) indicates that there is a contribution from firm 1’s effectiveness towards customers of firm 2
times the sum of the effectiveness of both firms’ campaigns towards market potential (mV2ρ1u1), as well as a
contribution from firm 1’s effectiveness towards market potential times firm 2’s cancel rate (mc2σ1v1). The
right hand side of (3.38) indicates that there is a contribution from the effectiveness towards market potential
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(σ1v1) times the sum of its effectiveness towards firm 2’s customers (ρ1u1) and firm 2’s cancellation rate
(c2), as well as its effectiveness towards firm 2’s customers times the firm 2’s effectiveness towards market
potential, all multiplied by market size m.
It should also be noted that for the special case ρk = σk and uk = vk (k = 1, 2) the equilibrium point
(3.37) reduces to the nontargeted equilibrium (2.33).
Lemma 3.4. The equilibrium point (3.37) is stable.
Proof. The Jacobian of (3.34)-(3.35) is given by
(3.39) J =
[− (c1 + σ1v1 + ρ2u2) (ρ1u1 − σ1v1)
(ρ2u2 − σ2v2) − (c2(t) + σ2v2 + ρ1u1)
]
,
which has eigenvalues
(3.40) λ± = −1
2
(
c1 + c2 + U2 + V2 ±
√
d∗
)
,
where
(3.41) d∗ = (c1 − c2)2 − 2(c1 − c2)(ρ1u1 − ρ2v2 − σ1v1 + σ2v2) + (U2 − V2)2.
It is clear that the real part of λ+ is negative. To demonstrate that the real part of λ− is negative, note that
d∗ = (c1 + c2 + U2 + V2)2 − [4c1c2 + c1(ρ1u1 + σ2v2) + c2(ρ2u2 + σ1v1) + U2V2] .
Since 0 ≤ |d∗| < (c1 + c2 + U2 + V2)2, <(
√
d∗) < c1 + c2 + U2 + V2 and therefore <(λ−) < 0. Thus the
equilibrium point (3.37) is stable. 
In the duopoly case, (3.37) implies that the equilibrium market potential is
(3.42) ε =
m(c1ρ1u1 + c2ρ2u2 + c1c2)
D2
.
The case for n = 3 is more complicated but the equilibrium point can be described. Define
(3.43) D3 =
3∏
k=1
ck +
3∑
k=1
σkvk 3∏
j 6=k
(cj + U3) + ρkukck
U3 + 3∑
j 6=k
ck
 .
Then the equilibrium solution is given by
s1 =
ρ1u1 (U3V3 + σ1v1(c2 + c3) + σ2v2c3 + σ3v3c2) + σ1v1
 3∑
j 6=k
ρkukck + c2c3
 /D3,
with s2 and s3 given similarly (for example, s2 is found by exchanging all terms with subscripts of 1 to terms
with subscripts of 2).
4. Targeted Advertising Strategies Under a Fixed Budget
In this section we discuss the application of the models presented in Sections 2 and 3 to answer various
strategic questions a firm may face when information identifying customers of competing firms (or the market
potential) and competitors’ behavior is available. While the open-loop and closed-loop solutions found in
Sections 2.1 and 3.1 give optimal strategies when all information about competitors’ advertising policies and
sales decay due to cancellation are known, it is often the case that firms must operate on limited information
and/or in a very short time horizon. Additionally, those open-loop and closed-loop strategies are computed
in the absence of a fixed budget for advertising expenditures (as all positive uk and vk are considered to be
admissible controls - a fixed advertising budget would remove these controls from the objective function).
In these cases a firm’s strategy may be determined by the current best course of action based on analyzing
the targeted and non-targeted models and their steady states.
Additionally, the models here can be applied to situations in which the primary objective is to simply
dominate the market share, maximize sales, or maximize rate of sales increase. For example, in the political
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candidate/election setting, the objective of each candidate is to have a larger market (voter) share at the
time of the election. In these cases the differential games formed by (2.8)–(2.9) and (3.5)–(3.6) are not as
relevant and further analysis of the models are required.
For the remainder of this section, we assume that firm 1 has a constant budget amount B for expenditures,
which implies that effort controls u1 and v1 satisfy u
2
1 +v
2
1 = B, or v1 =
√
B − u21. When B = 1, the control
u1 represents the square root of the portion of the budget that is allocated towards competitors’ customers.
4.1. Maximizing Rate of Increase of Sales Rate/Market Share. A firm or political candidate that
gains the ability to discern the customers/supporters of their competitors from the market potential may
wish to immediately implement an advertising strategy that will increase sales as quickly as possible in a
short time window. We describe the best strategy for initial allocation towards competitors’ customers to
maximize the current rate of increase of sales rate or market share.
Question 1: Given n − 1 competitors with nontargeted or targeted advertising policies,
which initial allocation of effort maximizes the instantaneous rate of sales increase for firm
k?
The objective for firm k is to maximize
(4.1) s˙k = mσk
√
1− u2k +
(
ρkuk − σk
√
1− u2k
) n∑
j=1
j 6=k
sj − sk
ck + σk√1− u2k + n∑
j=1
j 6=k
ρjuj
 .
with respect to uk. Note that firm j’s cancellation rates and efforts towards market potential do not affect
s˙k for all j 6= k. Define N to be the totality of the market that firm k does not hold, i.e.,
(4.2) N = m− sk,
and define X to be the proportion of N held by the competitors of firm k, i.e.,
(4.3) X =
1
N
 n∑
j 6=k
sj
 = m− ε− sk
N
=
N − ε
N
.
Then the allocation of effort that maximizes the rate of sales increase is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. Let firm k practice targeted advertising and assume u2k + v
2
k = 1. Then the instantaneous
rate of sales increase for firm k is maximized by the allocation
(4.4) uk =
ρkX√
σ2k(1−X)2 + ρ2kX2
,
where X is defined as in (4.3).
Proof. Differentiating (4.1) with respect to uk gives
∂s˙k
∂uk
=
−σkukm+ σk(m− ε− sk)
√
1− u2k + ρk(m− ε− sk)uk + skσkuk√
1− u2k
.
We have
∂s˙k
∂uk
= 0 =⇒ uk = ρk(m− ε− sk)√
σ2kε
2 + ρ2k(m− ε− sk)2
,
and since
∂2s˙k
∂u2k
=
−σkε
(1− u2k)3/2
,
the second derivative test indicates that s˙k is maximized there. Letting N = m − sk, we have that the
optimal u1 is
u1 =
ρk(N − ε)√
σ2kε
2 + ρ2k(N − ε)2
.
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Dividing through by N and letting X = (N − ε)/N so that ε/N = 1−X we have
u1 =
ρkX√
σ2k(1−X)2 + ρ2kX2
.

Theorem 4.1 is useful in that it gives a simple formulation that allows firm k to determine their best
course of action at the current moment, and all it requires is knowledge of its competitors’ proportion (X)
of the market not occupied by firm k (N). Dividing through by σk, (4.4) can be written as
(4.5) uk =
(ρk/σk)X√
(1−X)2 + (ρk/σk)2X2
.
Plots of the optimal choice of uk versus competitors’ non-firm k market share X for several choices of ρk/σk
are given in Figure 3. Because the horizontal axis is scaled to represent the proportion of the non-firm k
market, for a given ρk/σk, all curves have the same profile for any competitors’ share of the total market (the
profile of the curves is independent of the size of the non-firm k market N). It is important to note that the
Figure 3. Values of u2k from (4.5) that Maximize s˙k for varying ρk/σk
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horizontal axis is the proportion of the non-firm k market share occupied by the competitors, and not the
actual value of the competitors’ market share. Consider the context of a political candidate in an upcoming
election who obtains the ability to direct advertising di↵erently towards uncommitted voters and supporters
of the opponent (candidate 2). Suppose that candidate 1 currently holds 30% of the vote, and candidate
2 has 35% of the vote (so that candidate 2 holds X = 50% of the voters not committed to candidate 1).
If candidate 1’s advertising campaign is equally e↵ective towards uncommitted voters and supporters of
candidate 2 (so ⇢k/ k = 1), then
u21 =
(⇢k/ k)
2X2
(1 X)2 + (⇢k/ k)2X2 =
1 · 0.52
(0.5)
2
+ (1)2 (0.5)
2 =
1
2
,
so candidate 1 should split the campaign budget evenly across both categories. However, if candidate 1’s
advertising is twice as e↵ective at gaining uncommitted voters as it is in converting supporters of candidate
horizontal axis is the proportion of the non-firm k market share occupied by the competitors, and not the
actual value of the competitors’ market share. Consider the context of a political candidate in an upcoming
election who obtains the ability to direct advertising differently towards uncommitted voters and supporters
of the opponent (candidate 2). Suppose that candidate 1 currently holds 30% of the vote, and candidate
2 has 35% of the vote (so that candidate 2 holds X = 50% of the voters not committed to candidate 1).
If candidate 1’s advertising campaign is equally effective towards uncommitted voters and supporters of
candidate 2 (so ρk/σk = 1), then
u21 =
(ρk/σk)
2X2
(1−X)2 + (ρk/σk)2X2 =
1 · 0.52
(0.5)
2
+ (1)2 (0.5)
2 =
1
2
,
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so candidate 1 should split the campaign budget evenly across both categories. However, if candidate 1’s
advertising is twice as effective at gaining uncommitted voters as it is in converting supporters of candidate
2 (so ρk/σk = 1/2 = 0.5), then
u21 =
(ρk/σk)
2X2
(1−X)2 + (ρk/σk)2X2 =
0.25 · 0.52
(0.5)
2
+ 0.25 (0.5)
2 =
1
5
,
so candidate 1 should allocate only 20% of the campaign budget towards uncommitted voters.
Alternatively, if candidates 1 and 2 are both tied with 40% of the vote each, then candidate 2 holds
X = 2/3 of the market of voters not currently supporting candidate 1. In this case, the above scenarios
of ρk/σk = 1 and ρk/σk = 1/2 give optimal budget allocations of u
2
1 = 80% and u
2
1 = 50%, respectively
- drastically different strategies than the 30%-35% scenario above. The proposition below summarizes the
utility of this result.
Proposition 4.2. Under a fixed budget, the allocation of advertising effort that optimizes the rate of firm k’s
sales increase is determined only by firm k’s effort to effectiveness ratios and the proportion of the available
market held by firm k’s competitors, and is independent of sales decay rates, competitors’ strategies, efforts,
and effectiveness.
4.2. Targeted Advertising Strategies in an Oligopoly With Nontargeted Competitors. When it
is known that competing firms in an oligopoly practice nontargeted advertising, a firm that gains the ability
to discern the competitors’ customer base from the market potential should determine the conditions under
which a targeted advertising policy will lead to an increased market share. We assume that all firms’ sales
are at a steady state when the following questions are considered. In this case we have σ2 = ρ2 and v2 = u2.
With the assumption that v22 + u
2
2 = 1, we have that v2 = u2 = 1/
√
2.
Question 2: Given a single competitor with a nontargeted advertising policy, which allo-
cation of effort will maximize steady state market share?
If expenditures, efforts, and cancellation rates are all constant, then the equilibrium sales for firms 1 and 2
are
(4.6) s1 =
m
(
σ1 (ρ1 u1 + c2)
√
B − u12 + ρ1ρ2u1u2
)
(ρ1u1 + ρ2u2 + c2)
(
σ1
√
B − u12 + ρ2u2 + c1
)
and
(4.7) s2 =
ρ2u2
ρ1u1 + ρ2u2 + c2
.
To determine the best policy for firm 1, s1 is maximized with respect to u1. Assume for simplicity that
ρ1 = ρ2 = σ1 = 1 and m = 1. Then we have
(4.8) s1 =
1√
2
u1 + (c2 + u1)
√
1− u12(
1√
2
+ c2 + u1
)(
1√
2
+ c1 +
√
1− u12
) .
Given particular values for the cancellation rates c1 and c2, (4.8) can be maximized with respect to u1 to
determine the optimal allocation of effort. Values of s1 as a function of u1 for different values of c1 (with
c2 = 1) and c2 (with c1 = 1) are given in Figure 4, in which the red dot indicates the maximum of s1.
In Figure 4(a) we see that as c1 increases, market share is maximized by decreasing u1 (the effort towards
customers of the competitor), which corresponds to an increase in effort towards the market potential.
Interestingly, Figure 4(b) indicates similar behavior - as firm 2’s cancellation rate increases, firm 1 should
decrease the effort u1 towards the customers of firm 2 (thereby concentrating more effort towards the market
potential) in order to maximize the market share. From Figure 4 it is evident that the cancellation rate c1
has less of an impact than c2 on the choice of u1 that optimizes market share for firm 1. To illustrate the
dependence of the optimal u1 on c1 and c2, Figure 5 gives a contour plot of the value u1 that maximizes
s1 for varying c1 and c2. The optimal choice of u1 is determined numerically. For example, if c1 = 0.3 and
c2 = 0.2, then s1 is maximized when u
2
1 ≈ 0.76 (u1 ≈ 0.87), which means that to optimize steady sales, firm
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Figure 4. Dependence of s1 on c1 and c2 in (4.8)
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1 should dedicate around 76% of their advertising budget toward customers of firm 2. In this case the steady
state market shares for firm 1 and firm 2 are s1 ≈ 0.429 and s2 ≈ 0.397.
However, if we examine the case c1 = c2 = 0.9, then we have that u
2
1 ≈ 0.43 (u1 ≈ 0.65) maximizes s1.
Then the optimal (for firm 1) equilibrium market shares are
(4.9) s1 ≈ 0.306, s2 ≈ 0.313.
This leads to an important observation:
Proposition 4.3. When cancellation rates, advertising budgets, and effectiveness to effort ratios for each
firm are all the same, the targeted strategy that maximizes sales rate/market share does not necessarily lead
to higher sales than a competitor practicing nontargeted advertising.
In other words, if a leading market share is more important than maximizing the market share, a different
allocation of effort may be in order.
Question 3: Given a single competitor with a nontargeted advertising policy, which allo-
cation of effort will ensure a greater steady state market share than your competitor?
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Figure 5. Contour plot of u21 that maximizes s1 for c1 and c2 in (4.8)
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The answer to this question (what choices of u1 ensure s1 > s2) varies greatly depending on the relative values
of c1 and c2. Subtracting (4.7) from (4.6) and employing the assumptions ρ1 = ρ2 = σ1 = 1, u2 = 1/
√
2,
and v1 =
√
1− u21, then s1 − s2 > 0 whenever
(4.10)
√
1− u21
(
c+ u1 +
1√
2
)
+
1√
2
(
u1 − c− 1√
2
)
> 0.
The region in the u21, c-plane that satisfies (4.10) (and therefore ensures s1 > s2) is shaded in Figure 6, along
with curves that identify the value of u21 that maximizes s1− s2 and the value of u21 that maximizes s1. Note
that u1 = 1/
√
2 will always guarantee s1 = s2 as this reduces firm 1 to the same nontargeted advertising
policy as firm 2. In relation to the example illustrated in (4.9), the choice of effort u21 = 0.637 (u1 = 0.798)
leads to steady market shares of
(4.11) s1 ≈ 0.299, s2 ≈ 0.293,
again reinforcing the conclusion that maximized market share does not imply leading market share, and vice
versa.
Proposition 4.4. When employing targeted advertising with a competitor who practices nontargeted adver-
tising with an identical budget and sales decay rate 0 < c ≤ 1, a strategy that ensures market share greater
than your competitor is always possible. Additionally, the strategy that maximizes market share does not
coincide with the strategy that maximizes the lead in market share over your competitor.
4.3. Extension to a Single Firm with Service/Product Tiers. The targeted advertising model can
also be adapted to represent the sales dynamics of a single firm’s internal competition among products or
services. Consider the case that a single firm offers a product/service at several (n) different levels or tiers,
and assume that the customers of each tier are mutually-exclusive (i.e., no single customer simultaneously
contributes to the sales of more than one level/tier). Often the firm’s objectives are twofold: to recruit new
customers from the market potential, as well as to have existing customers of lower-tier products/services
upgrade to a higher tier. Assume the firm wishes to prevent downgrades in level, so higher tiers consider
customers of lower tiers as potential customers, but not vice-versa.
Let k = 1, 2, . . . , n represent the n tiers of product/service, with the convention that k = 1 represents the
highest tier, k = 2 the next highest, and so on, with k = n representing the entry-level tier. The multi-tier
model is based on modifying (3.2) to incorporate the following assumptions. Since all non-customers of the
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Figure 6. the shaded area indicates the choices of u21 that ensure s1 > s2 when c1 = c2 = c.
The solid curve indicates the value of u21 that maximizes s1 − s2, while the dotted curve
represents the value of u21 that maximizes s1.
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firm comprise the market potential, the firm (all tiers) would have a uniform advertising effort v(t) towards
ε(t). However, the effectiveness to effort ratios σk will vary among the tiers, in particular if new customers
are more likely to sign up for the entry-level tier as opposed to the highest tier. Additionally, tier 1 would
have an advertising campaign directed towards customers of tiers 2, . . . , n, tier 2 would advertise towards
tiers 3, . . . , n and so on (tier n would only gain customers from the market potential). Each tier would have
its own cancellation rate. Then the dynamics of the market share sk of tier k would be modeled by
(4.12) s˙k(t) = σkv(t)
m− n∑
j=1
sj(t)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
market potential
+ρkuk(t)
n∑
j>k
sj(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
lower tiers
−sk(t)
ck(t) +
n∑
j<k
ρjuj(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
higher tiers
 .
Dropping the notational dependence upon t, when there are two tiers within a service/product line, we
have
s˙1 = σ1v (m− s1 − s2) + ρ1u1s2 − s1c1,(4.13)
s˙2 = σ2v (m− s1 − s2)− s2 (c2 + ρ1u1) .(4.14)
One objective would be to minimize the equilibrium market potential, thereby ensuring the firm has as many
customers as possible. For n = 2, the equilibrium solution of (4.13)–(4.14) is given by
s1 =
mv((σ1 + σ2)ρ1u1 + c2σ1)
((σ1 + σ2)v + c1)ρ1u1 + (c1σ2 + c2σ1)v + c1c2
,
and
s2 =
mvσ2c1
((σ1 + σ2)v + c1)ρ1u1 + (c1σ2 + c2σ1)v + c1c2
.
Then the equilibrium market potential is given by
(4.15) ε =
mc1(c2 + ρ1u1)
((σ1 + σ2)v + c1)ρ1u1 + (c1σ2 + c2σ1)v + c1c2
,
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and can be minimized with respect to one of the parameters given particular choices for the remaining
parameters.
A practical interpretation of this model would be the case where 1) the advertising budget is fixed (at
1) so u21 + v
2 = 1, and 2) the effectiveness to effort ratios towards potential are the same for both tiers
(σ1 = σ2 = σ). Further, if m = ρ1 = 1, we have that (4.15) gives an equilibrium market potential of
(4.16) ε =
c1(c2 + u1)
(σ(c1 + c2 + 2u1)
√
1− u21 + c1(c2 + u1))
.
In this case, an advertising strategy that minimizes market potential (maximizing market share) can be
described.
Theorem 4.5. Let σ1 = σ2 = σ = 1, ρ1 = 1, m = 1, and assume u
2
1 + v
2 = 1. If c1 ≥ c2, then u1 = 0
minimizes the equilibrium market potential (4.16), and if c1 < c2, then the equilibrium market potential is
minimized for
(4.17) u∗1 =
10c22 − 6c1c2 + ∆2/31 − 4c2∆1/31
6∆
1/3
1
,
where
∆1 = 36c1c
2
2 − 28c32 − 54c1 + 54c2 + 6
√
∆0,
and
∆0 = 6 (c1 − c2)
(
c52 + 2c1c
4
2 +
(
c21 + 14
)
c32 − 18c1c22 −
27c2
2
+
27c1
2
)
.
Proof. Differentiating (4.16) with respect to u1 gives
∂ε
∂u1
=
c1
(
2u1
3 + 4c2u1
2 + c2 (c1 + c2)u1 + c1 − c2
)
√
1− u12
(
(c1 + c2 + 2u1)
√
1− u12 + c1 (c2 + u1)
)2 .
This is defined for all c1 > 0, c2 > 0, and 0 ≤ u1 ≤ 1. Let
p(u1) = 2u1
3 + 4c2u1
2 + c2 (c1 + c2)u1 + c1 − c2.
Then the zeros of ∂ε/∂u1 are the zeros of p. We consider two cases.
Case 1: (c1 ≥ c2) Then p > 0 for all 0 ≤ u1 ≤ 1 and thus ε is at a minimum when u1 = 0.
Case 2: (c1 < c2) Since p(0) < 0 and p(1) > 0, the Intermediate Value Theorem implies the existence of
a 0 < u∗1 < 1 such that p(u
∗
1) = 0, and an application of Rolle’s theorem shows u
∗
1 is unique as p
′(u1) > 0
everywhere in 0 < u1 < 1. In this case u
∗
1 is given by (4.17) and is guaranteed to minimize ε. 
Figure 7 gives a contour map of the values of u1 that minimize ε for different choices of c1 and c2. For
example, if the cancellation rate for tier 1 is c1 = 0.1 and for tier 2 is c2 = 0.2, then an allocation of around
6.25% of the advertising budget (as u1 ≈ 0.25) targeting upgrades for customers of the second tier will
minimize the market potential (maximize the total market share of the firm).
One of the main implications of Theorem 4.5 is that if customers of the higher tier are more likely to cancel
service than those of the lower tier (c1 ≥ c2), the market potential is minimized when all advertising effort
is dedicated toward the market potential, implying that any overall gain in market share from encouraging
upgrades is lost through the higher cancellation rate for those customers who do upgrade.
Proposition 4.6. The advertising strategy that minimizes total market potential for a firm that offers two
tiers of product/service depends on the relative effectiveness of campaigns directed towards existing customers
and market potential and the sales decay rates for each tier. In particular, when the effectiveness of both
campaigns are identical and the sales decay rate is larger for the higher tier, all advertising effort should be
directed towards the market potential and no effort should be directed towards enticing existing customers to
upgrade.
DYNAMIC MODELING OF NONTARGETED AND TARGETED ADVERTISING STRATEGIES IN AN OLIGOPOLY 23
Figure 7. Value of u1 that minimizes ε in (4.16)
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5. Summary
Existing oligopoly advertising models were modified to incorporate market share decrease by cancellation
and subsequently extended to allow for differing advertising policies for the market potential and competitor
customer base. Closed-loop Nash equilibrium strategies were found for both the nontargeted and targeted
models. Steady state market shares were identified in the case of constant parameters, and several applica-
tions of the models were employed to address strategic questions when the ability to discern competitors’
customers from market potential is available. The analysis points to several interesting conclusions:
• When operating with a fixed budget, the allocation of effort towards competitors’ customers and mar-
ket potential that optimizes the current rate of sales increase is independent of whether competitors
employ targeted or nontargeted advertising as well as sales decay rates.
• When employing a targeted advertising approach, the distribution of effort that maximizes steady
state market share does not always lead to a market share greater than a competitor practicing
nontargeted advertising.
• For a single firm with multiple tiers of product/service, the allocation of effort that minimizes market
potential is heavily dependent on the relative sales decay rates of the tiers.
It is anticipated that the targeted model and the observations made here may be of use to firms as they gain
the ability to group advertising targets. Further work in this direction could include:
• Extension to the case of differing efforts for different competitors.
• Extension to competing firms with multiple product lines (in the spirit of [10]).
• Incorporating more sophisticated models of effort and effectiveness of customer retention activities.
• Extension of the single-firm multi-tier analysis to multiple firms each offering several tiers of prod-
uct/service.
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